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Meinhard Doelle*

The Kyoto Protocol: Reflections on
its Significance on the Occasion of its
Entry into Force

When the Kyoto Protocol was signed in December 1997, there were high hopes
in some quarters that it marked the beginning of a global commitment to climate
change mitigation. In the past seven years, however, the Protocol has languished
while many of the kev, States have done little to implement it. Until the fall of 2004
it was uncertain whether the Protocol would ever enter into force. To the surprise
of many, with ratification by Russia, it came into effect on February 16, 2005, only
three years before the start of the first period of commitments to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions into the environment.
This comment marks the occasion of the entry into force of the Protocol. The
author considers Bruce Pardys recent critique of the Protocol in the Journal of
Environment Law Pardy is one of the minority of academic writers who maintain
the Protocol is so fundamentally flawed that we would make more progress without
it. The author challenges Pardo s arguments and concludes that the Protocol
may prove to be the most crucial step toward an effective international response
to climate change.

Au moment ou le Protocole de Kyoto a ete signe, en decembre 1997, certains
entretenaient de grands espoirs, croyant qu 'ils s'agissait du premier pas vers un
engagement mondial a la prise de mesures d'attenuation des changements
climatiques. Cependant, au cours des sept dernieres annees, le Protocole a langui
dans l'ombre pendant que beaucoup des principaux Etats ont peu fait pour le
mettre en oeuvre. Jusqu'a lautomne 2004, il etalt impossible de dire si le Protocole
entreraitjamais en vigueur A la surprise de beaucoup, il a survdcu, et grace J la
ratification par la Russie, le Protocole est entre en vigueur le 16 fbvrier 2005, trois
ans a peine avant le debut de la premiere periode d'application des engagements
a reduire les emissions de gaz a effet de serre dans Ienvironnement.
Le present commentaire est publie a Ioccasion de Ientrde en vigueur du
Protocole. L'auteur examine la recente critique du protocole par Bruce Pardy
critique qui a ete publiee dans le Journal of Environment Law Bruce Pardy
appartienta la minorite des universitaires qui pretendent que le Protocole souffre
de lacunes si fondamantales que nous realisiserions des progres plus importants
sil n'existait pas. Lauteur conteste les arguments avances par Bruce Pardy et
conclut que le Protocole pourra se reveler 6tre la mesure primordiale qui
provoquera une reaction internationaleefficace aux changements climatiques.

Asistant Professor of Law, and Associate Director, Marine & Environmental Law Institute,
Dalhousie University
*
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In December 1997, the parties to the United Nations Framework ConvenO
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
' successfully negotiated the Kyoto
Protocol.' It was and continues to be the only international agreement that
includes obligatory emission reductions designed to mitigate human-induced climate change.
In essence, the Kyoto Protocol obliges developed member States to
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to 1990 levels.' Reductions in emissions may be achieved through domestic emission reductions
and through a number of alternative avenues provided for in the Protocol.
Approved alternatives to domestic emission reductions include funding
emission reductions in other States, purchasing emission reduction credits
from States that have exceeded their reduction targets, and making up for
emissions through efforts to take GHGs out of the atmosphere more quickly
then would happen naturally.
Initially most States signed the Protocol,but few ratified it. Now, years
later, on February 16, 2005, the Kvoto Protocol has, with its recent
ratification by the Russian Federation, finally come into force.4 Russia's
ratification had become essential for the operation of the Protocolafter the
United States declared in 2001 that it was not prepared to join the Kyoto
process. The Protocol requires, in order to come into force, States representing 55% of developed country emissions to ratify it.5 Since the United
States and Russia represent 36.1% and 17.4% of emissions respectively,
the Protocol could not come into effect until at least one of them ratified it.
Russia deposited its ratification on November 18, 2004,6 clearing the way
for the Protocol to come into force 90 days later,' on February 16, 2005.
There has been considerable debate about the Kvoto Protocol in the
past seven years. Some have argued that the Kvoto Protocol is an
inadequate response to a serious threat to human survival. Others have

I. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change OR, 5th Sess., Annex, UN Doc. A/
AC.237/18 (Partll)/Add.l (1992),31 I.LM. 849, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
a/ I8p2aO .pdf'> [UNFCCC].
2.
For an overview of the Protocolsee Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, Kvoto Protocolto the UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change, 3d Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 5, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. I (1998), 37 I.L.M. 22 [hvoto Protoco].
3.
The main anthropogenic greenhouse gases covered by the Protocol are carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, and the main source of their release is the burning of fossil fuels.
4
Kvoto Protocol, supra note 2.
5.
Ibid., art. 25.
6.
See online: UNFCCC <http://www.unfccc.int>.
7.
kvoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 25.
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said that the Protocol will cause unnecessary economic and social harm.
A few still suggest that the science on climate change is too uncertain to
justify the action required under the Protocol. Its entry into force provides
an opportunity to reflect on these debates especially since the Protocol is
now destined to be the focal point of any efforts the international community may make to cooperatively address climate change. It is also likely to
have a significant influence over domestic action on climate change,
particularly in high emission, developed countries such as Canada.
One part of the debate over the Protocolhas been about whether there
is enough known about the science of climate change to justify its requirements.' This concern has lost credibility over the past decade because of
overwhelming scientific evidence that climate change is taking place and
is caused largely by the release of greenhouse gases from human activity.
The debate is therefore not considered here. Instead the author addresses
the dominant debate of recent years over the adequacy of the Kvoto Protocol to address climate change. The debate has extended to the impact of
the Kvoto Protocol on the future of international environmental law and
its effect on compliance with international law.9
The Kvoto Protocolhas not been universally endorsed by the academic
community. A minority thinks that the Kyoto Protocol is too flawed and
too small a step to make any positive contribution. The remainder, including this writer, consider the Protocol to be an inadequate but crucial 1st
step forward for international cooperation on climate change. They think
the Protocolhas the potential to lead the way to more meaningful cooperation on other global environmental challenges as well.
In Canada, the debate over the importance of the Kvoto Protocol has
been energized by a recent article by Bruce Pardy published in the Journal
of EnvironmentalPractice.'0 In his article, Pardy takes the position that
the Protocol is fundamentally flawed and that we would make more progress
on climate change without it. Pardy supports his position with five specific critiques of the Protocol, critiques that have been reflected in the
literature from the time the Protocol was negotiated.

8.
See e.g., Petr Chylek & Glen Lesins, eds., "The First International Conference on Global Warming and the Next Ice Age" (August 19-24, 2001) Dalhousie University, Conference Proceedings.
See also Henry R. Linden, -C02 Does Not Pollute: But Kvoto's Demise Won't End Debate" (15
May 2001) 139:10 Public Utilities Formnightlv 22.
9. See Jutta Brunee, "The Kvoto Protocol:Testing Ground For Compliance Theories?" (2003) 63
Heidelberg Journalof InternationalLaw 255.
10. See Bruce Pardy, "The Kyoto Protocol: Bad News for the Global Environment" (2004) 14 J.
Envtl. L. & Prac. 27.

558

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Pardy's first argument is that the focus on reductions of GHG
emissions from current levels, rather than on absolute emission limits, is
flawed.' Secondly, he challenges the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities in the UVNF'CC, as well as the Kvoto Protocol.2
Thirdly, Pardy suggests that Kvoto rewards polluters rather than making
them pay.'" Pardy's fourth argument is that the Protocol promotes development over sustainability. 4 Finally, he argues that the Kvoto Protocol
implicitly accepts the long term management of the climate as a final outcome." Thus, Pardy concludes that Protocol is an inadequate first step
and that there would be more meaningful progress on climate change
without it.
In taking up the issues raised by Pardy, it is important to point out that
considerable agreement exists between the Protocol's supporters and
opponents. It is generally agreed that the Kvoto Protocol by itself is
inadequate to address climate change and that, in the long term, a number
of its shortcomings will create significant challenges for the negotiation of
future commitments. Disagreement, howvexer, exists over the question
whether the Kvoto Protocol and the L'NFC('C are worse than no international agreement. While the author of this comment agrees that the Kvoto
Protocol is only a small step in terms of direct GHG emission reductions,
it may nevertheless prove to be the most crucial step toward an effective
international response to climate change.
For the supporters of the Kvoto Protocol climate change is not a
problem that can be sol\ ed by one agreement. In that respect, some of the
criticisms of the international response to climate change may reflect
unrealistic expectations of the climate change regime at its current stage of
development. It has become clear during the years since its signing in 1997
that the Koto Protocol has struck a delicate balance. More effective
efforts' 6 to set binding targets to reduce GHG emissions environmentally
would surely have doomed the Protocol to failure.'

I1. Ibid. at 21)
12. Ibid. at 31.
I3. Ibid, at 34.
14 Ibid. at 35.
15. Ibid. at37.
16 In the form of the first commitment period target., to dcxcloped countries to reduce emissions
by 2012.
17 A combination of a di,
tru't of international institutions and a .,trong industrial lobby in the U.S.
ha' made it,participation in the foreseeable future unlikely. In the absence of U.S. participation,
many countric. including Canada, Japan, Russia, and Australia, \%ere reluctant to ratify. It is highly
unlikely that an environmentally stronger agreement would have survixed the U.S. withdrawal. This
would hac left Europe a' the only block of developed nation'. committed to addressing climate change.
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As Pardy asserts in his article, the unwillingness of the international
community to take more meaningful action does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that the Protocol is better than nothing." It does suggest a
certain baseline or reference point to determine whether we are better off
with or without the Protocol. The Protocol does not have to be an utopian
solution. It does have to be better than nothing at all." From the Canadian
perspective, the Kvoto Protocol passes this test with ease.
The argument that Canadians would be better off without the Kvoto
Protocol rests on the assumption either that no Protocol would induce
Canada to take more meaningful unilateral action on climate change or
that it would spur the international community to reach a better arrangement, which would generate more action in Canada. The first alternative is
not credible. There were no signs of serious government action on climate
change (except from a handful of municipalities) until after the signing of
the Kvoto Protocol in 1997."' More importantly, until the signing of the
Protocol and the subsequent debate over its ratification by Canada in
December 2002. there was no public pressure on governments to take
action on climate change. In fact, until the public debate over ratification,
the Canadian media rarely covered the subject of climate change and few
Canadians understood the issues involved, let alone considered them
prionties. 2'
This leaves us the question whether bringing Kvoto into force will
reduce or increase the chance of reaching agreement on more meaningful
reductions in the long term. The general concern (and one which needs to
be taken very seriously regarding any partial solution to an environmental
problem) is whether agreement to the Protocol as a first step will slow
down or stop the pressure for an effective long term solution. There are
many examples of inadequate initial responses to environmental challenges

18. Supra note I Oat 41
19. Whether the ki,,,, Protocol passes this testcan be considered both from a Canadian and a
global perspective. Bruce Pardy, while making some reference to both, focuses on the Protocl\
influence on Canadian action on climate change, so this critique follows suit. It is suggested, hossever, that the case for the Protocol from an international perspectisc iseven more compelling.
See David R. Boyd. Unnatural Law. Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policv
20
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003) at 86. The only measures implemented in
response to the L \FCCC in the early 1990s sscre voluntary measures that proved incapable of ensunng a return to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (one of the non-binding commitments Canada made
in ratifying the UNFCCCi
21. For recent trends on public opinion on Kvoto and climate change, see EKOS Research Associates, "Canadian Attitudes Towards Climate Change: Spring 2004. Survey for Ens ironment Canada
and Natural Resources Canada (April 2004).
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v~hich arguably became major impediments to actual solutions. One is the
environmental side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement.2 2 A domestic example might be the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act (CEAA) 21 which has turned out to be, at best, a partial
response to the flaws of its predecessor, the Environmental Assessment
24
and Review Process Guidelines Order.
Fortunately, the Protocol does not block future improvements. Indeed
the need to improve on the Protocol and to continue to push for a final
solution to climate change is built into the Kyoto process. Both the UNFCCC
and the Kvoto Protocol recognize that the targets negotiated are only a
first step and that further significant reductions are necessary. The UNFCCC
provrides a process and a timetable for the negotiation of further reductions. 25 In fact, negotiations are already underway and, with the entry into
force of the Protocol, they are expected to become the priority of the
parties to the UNFCCC.25
With the Protocol in place, the parties will be able to focus on fixing
problems encountered in the implementation of the current obligations, as
well as on agreeing to further reductions, rather than redesigning an international regime. 27 In any case, the Kyoto Protocol requires significant
reductions of GHG emissions over business-as-usual projections in developed countries. In Canada, the reduction will be roughly 30% below
business-as-usual projections. On this basis alone, the Protocolis clearly
better than no agreement at all.
In addition to these general observations on why Kyoto is unquestion-

22. NorthAmertcanAgreement on Environmental Cooperation, 8 September 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
23. S.C. 1992, c. 37.
24 The passage of CEAA may be argued to have muted any serious debate on how to make environmental assessments in Canada a meaningful tool for sustainability. For a good assessment of
CEAA and its shortcomings, see Robert B. Gibson, "'Favouring the Higher Test: Contribution to
Sustainability as the Central Criteion for Reviews and Decisions under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act" (20001, 10 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 39 and A. John Sinclair & Meinhard Doelle,
"Using Law as a Tool to Ensure Meaningful Public Participation in Environmental Assessment"
(2003) 12 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 27.
25. For a detailed assessment of the Kvoto Protocol and the current status of the Climate Change
regime, see Meinhard Doelle, "From Kt, to Marrakech; A Long Walk Through the Desert: Mirage
or Oasis?" 25 Dal. L. J. 113.
26. By how much will depend on a number of factors, including developments on the science, the
U.S. position on Koto, and the practical experience of parties in implementing climate change mitigation to meet their reduction targets.
27. There is, of course, no guarantee that negotiations will be fruitful, but the tediously drawn out
negotiations that have resulted in the agreements on institutions and ground rules for emission reduction negotiations, reporting, accounting etc., do not have to be repeated. The institutions are
working; it is the substantive issues that are making more progress difficult.
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ably better than no international agreement on binding commitments for
reductions in developed countries, this commentary will now turn to Pardy's
five specific criticisms identified at the outset.
1.Is Kvotoflawed because of its /ocus on reductions ratherthan on limits?

Pardy argues that the Kvoto Protocol is flawed because of its focus on
reductions rather than absolute limits on emissions. In terms of the objective of reducing the human imprint on the world's climate, however, there
is nothing inherently wrong with a focus on reductions rather than limits
in setting interim reduction targets. Both absolute limits and reductions
can achieve the same overall reduction in emissions. Indeed, there are some
advantages to using reductions over absolute limits.
The focus on reductions avoids the potential problem of allocating
emission rights or the perception of doing so. In other words, it allowed
the parties to the Kvoto Protocol to agree on interim targets while negotiations on the longer term equity issues continued.28 Nevertheless, as we
move from interim steps to a final solution, it may be beneficial to adopt
absolute limits. Pardy's preference is that emissions limits should be set
on a per capita or per landmass basis, but this approach would create
serious equity problems, which are discussed below.
2. Is Ki'oto flawed because of its reliance on common but differentiated
responsibilities?

The short answer is that this principle is essential for an equitable global
response to climate change. Many critics, including the Bush administration in the United States, have been opposed to the Kyoto Protocol in part
due to its application of the principle of common and differentiated
responsibilities. 29 The fact that the current U.S. administration is using the
absence of targets for developing countries as a reason not to join the Kyoto
process does not, of course, in itself mean the principle is flawed, though it
does point to problems with its implementation. It is noteworthy that the
United States is a party to the UNFCCC3 ° and other environmental agree-

28. Developing countries particularly were concerned that assigned amounts under the Kvoto Protocol should not be seen as rights to emit, but as obligations to reduce.
29. See UNFCCC,supra note 1, art. 3 for a reflection of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities.
30. Ibid
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3
ments such as the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances 1
xhich include and apply this principle. It is also important to recognise
that the idea of setting different reduction targets for different States, was

necessary, in the context of the Kyoto negotiations, to reach any agreement to start the process of reducing GHG emissions. Setting targets based
simply on a per capita basis would have ignored other significant factors
such as historical responsibility, differences in population density, differences in climate, and differences in access to renewable sources of energy.
It is not surprising, therefore, that simple per capita emission limits
have been opposed by developed and developing countries alike. The per
capita approach isa recipe for inaction in the short to medium term as well
as being inequitable. It is already clear from work done by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)" 2 and other bodies that the
targets agreed to in the Kroto Protocol will be much harder to meet by
some States than others. Interestingly, some of the States with the highest
per capita emission baselines Will have the greatest difficulty achieving
their targets.

More important than the issue of equity among developed countries is
the importance of equity between developed and developing countries.
Just as any solution to climate change that ignores links to other environmental issues is doomed to failure, so to is a solution that ignores equities
between the have and have not nations of the xNorld."

31. See ,.g Elizabeth R. DeSombre, "The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, and Remarkably Particular" (2001) 19 UC LA J.Enstl. L.& Pol'y 49 For the key international agreement on ozone layer depicting subtance,,see the lontreal Prutoc ,I on Substances that
Dct1 /.ht, the -,t,Layer, I ) September 1987, 1522 L N T S 3. Can, T.S I9Q89) No. 42, 26 l.L %I
I 5511(entered into force I January 1989), online. United Nations Environment Programme <http://
>.
%%svk
%.unep.org ozone pdf \.lontreal-Protocol2000.pdf
32. For a detaled assessment ,t regional costs and ancillar_ benefit. of climate change mitigation,
see Bert \l tet al , eds , Climate Chang4e 2001. litigation. Contribution ofilbrkiing Group 111 to
the Third I so5mnCtt Report of the iniits'm ,ernm'ttal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Cambridge, England: Cambridge Universits Press, 2001) at 499 - 551 [IPC(].
33. For a good discussion of possible long term solutions to the allocation problem that take into
account equit issues such as historical responsibility and capacity to respond, see Ke in A. Baumert
(ss ith Odile Blanchard, Sil\ ia [ losa & James F. Perkaus;. ed.. Building on the kt ot1Protocol: Opti',s for Protecting the Climate (Washington. I).C.World Resources Institute, 2002), online: \VR1
-http: pdlwri org opc full pdf. See also Global Commons Institute, online: GCI <http://
sv,,w gci.org.uk/>, for technical support and information concerning "'Contraction and Convergence."
* planning model, ('ontraction and Cons crgence Options,' is also available for download. See also
V Bhaskar, "l)istributve Justice and the ( ontrol of Global \\arming" in V Bhaskar & Andrew
Glyn, eds., The Vorth, the South and the I'nvironent (London: United Nations University Press,
I)1)5102, \lichacl Grubb, "Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate
Change" (1995) 71 lnternationalAf/airs 463; Eileen Claussen & Lisa McNeilly, Equi' & Global
Climate Change" The ( ',tpi' Elements , Global Fairnes '\Vashington, D.C.: Pew Center on
Global Climate Change, 1998), online: PC'( ( <http %%ssx.pexclimate.org.>
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One real shortcoming of the Kvoto Protocol is that the targets for
developed countries are based on pledges by individual States. There was
no agreement on principles to guide the allocation of obligations to reduce
emissions. The failure to agree on principles will make the future negotiation of commitment periods and targets difficult. Nonetheless, the
negotiations will be much less difficult than they would have been without
the Protocol.
3. Does Kvoto reward polluters:
The suggestion that the Kvoto Protocol rewards polluters assumes that the
Protocol is a complete and final international solution, that in its absence
there would be something more onerous in place for polluters, or that it
will allow States to establish long term emission rights based on 1990
emissions. In fact the baseline of 1990 has been very useful in rewarding
early action and in reducing the risk that parties will intentionally delay
negotiations to avoid having to take any action. There is nothing in the
Protocol to support the position that the baseline can somehow be translated into a right to emit GHG at historical levels after 2012. Further, there
is no indication that the targets of the three worst per capita polluters, the
United States, Canada, and Australia, are more lenient than those of the
European Union and other countries with a lower baseline. Of the three
Australia is the only State that is recognized to have an easy target to meet
despite having one of the highest levels of emissions per capita. 34
Compared to the absence of an international agreement the Kvoto
Protocol clearly makes polluters pay. At the same time, the Protocol is a
long way from forcing States to internalize the full cost of climate change.
Much tougher targets are clearly needed beyond 2012 to make polluters
pay for all the consequences of their actions.
4. Is Kyoto flawed because it promotes development over sustainabilitv?
There is little doubt that the targets for the first commitment period in the
Protocol will not prevent further unsustainable development. For instance,
coal-burning power plants are still being built in many parts of the world
even though coal is the most GHG-intensive way to produce electricity. At
the same time, the Protocol does make a modest contribution to the
promotion of sustainable development. The significance of that contribu-

34.

See IPCC, supra note 32 at 501.
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tion will depend on the implementation choices made by the parties. 5 With
appropriate use of techniques such as the Clean Development Mechanism
and an integrated approach to domestic implementation that takes advantage of links and co-benefits, " the contribution the Kvoto Protocol makes
to sustainability could be significantly enhanced.
For the Protocol to become an effective tool for sustainability,
however, many of its shortcomings will have to be addressed in conjunction with the negotiation of targets for future commitment periods. In the
meantime, perhaps the most important contribution it will make to
sustainable development is to signal that the international community has
irreversibly entered a new phase globally, that of a carbon-constrained
world. Just such a signal has played a pivotal role in the international
response to other environmental issues such as ozone layer depletion and
acid rain.
5. Does Kvoto aim too low by accepting the long-term management of
climate change?

It is clearly premature to accept the long-term need to manage the global
climate. It may, in any case, be arrogant to assume that we can achieve
such a feat. In the meantime, however, we have no choice but to muddle
through managing as best as we can. Critics such as Pardy are right to
point out that we need to focus our efforts on reducing our impact on
climate change rather than accepting long-term management of the
climate system. Nonetheless, the Kyoto process, as difficult and imperfect
as it is, is still the most realistic and promising path to follow.
6. Is Kvoto substantively inadequateas a first step"

Many critics of the Kvoto Protocol argue that it is inadequate even as an
interim measure. The difficulty is that is there is no appropriate comparison. The comparison to the Stockholm Declaration made by Pardy ignores
fundamental differences between the soft law nature of that declaration
and binding treaties. A comparison to the MontrealProtocolon ozone layer
depletion 37 may be more appropriate. Although initially that agreement
was inadequate, the implementation of its first targets in combination with
scientific developments motivated the parties to take further steps to

35. See Meinhard Doelle. "Linking the Avoto Protocol and Other Multilateral Environmental Agreements From Fragmentation to Integration'?" (2004) 14 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 75.
36. Ibid
37 . Supra note 31.
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address the problem. It should not be forgotten, however, that climate change
is a much more fundamental challenge to the western way of life that ozone
layer depletion ever was.
It is not surprising that the Kvoto Protocol will only have a small
impact on climate change. It is important, however, not to confuse small
with easy or inadequate. The Protocol may be a small step toward reducing GHG emissions but it is an extremely difficult step in terms of what it
challenges States to do. In addition, the Kvoto Protocol has broken new
ground for multilateral environmental agreements through the commitments required to meet its obligations and the nature of its compliance
regime. It is also worth reiterating that the Protocol has already had a
significant impact in Canada. a State that to date has shown no willingness
to lead internationally on climate change. It is only now, after the Kvoto
Protocol has been ratified, that Canada is taking its first serious steps to
mitigate climate change.
Many who dismiss the Kvoto Protocol make the serious mistake of
assuming that because on its own, it is inadequate in addressing climate
change, it is not a worthwhile step forward. That is a fallacy. Achieving
global consensus to address climate change in one step was impossible.
Setting expectations for international cooperation so high would have
doomed the international community to inaction. The Kvoto Protocoldoes
much better than that. It marks the beginning of meaningful binding international agreements to address global environmental challenges. It may
be the first multilateral environmental agreement that forces States to act
against their short term self interests in order to cooperatively address a
global challenge. It is unprecedented both in its short term costs and its
long term risks and benefits.
This comment offers an alternative to Pardy's analogy of the role of
the Kvoto Protocol in the development of a global response to climate
change. The analogy Pardy uses is one of a family who spends more than
it earns. He suggests that ratifying the Protocol amounts to the family
making decisions to reduce spending without knowing the extent of the
debt, and without knowing if the commitments by individual family
members to reduce spending will solve the deficit problem. A more
appropriate analogy is that of a train travelling through thick fog. The
conductor, at the start of the trip, is instructed to try to determine how fast
the train can go. In the middle of the experiment, the passengers receive
information that the train is heading for a brick wall, but no one can see it
through the fog, and no one knows how close the wall is. The conductor
informs the passengers that he can only interrupt the experiment if they all
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agree and collectively give new instructions.
The Kvoto Protocol represents an agreement to slow down while the
parties try to agree on the credibility of the information and to ascertain
how close the wall is." Most passengers would favour an agreement to
stop the train. In the absence of such an agreement, and without any
ability to get off the train, it is safe to assume that they would welcome an
agreement to slow down.
There is no reason to think that the ratification of the Kvoto Protocol
will detract from the urgent need to address climate change. At the same
time, it must be recognized that Kyoto has started the process of slowing
doN n. To continue the analogy, slowing down the train is a good start, but
as long as the train continues to move ahead, at whatever speed, catastrophe is inevitable. The Kvoto Protocol is at once both inadequate and an
example of the ability of the international community, in the face of
tremendous odds, to collectiv ely respond to a complex challenge. Our immediate goal should be to seize the opportunity the Kyoto process provides.

38.

And for the fog to di....pate

